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  For nearly 150 years, the Oregon appellate court system has served the public with a high degree of 
ingenuity and innovation.  Oregon’s appellate judges are consistently regarded as among the best and 
brightest in the nation.  But as Oregon’s population continues to increase, combining with a more 
litigious citizenry and tighter state budgets, the efficient administration of justice in the appellate courts 
grows more elusive by the day.  At present, civil litigants in Oregon’s appellate courts must often wait 
up to four years and spend thousands of dollars to receive a final disposition. 
 
  At the time of statehood in 1859, the primary function of the Oregon Supreme Court, as the state’s only 
appellate court, was to review decisions of the trial courts.  Today, appellate court jurisdiction in Oregon 
extends far beyond the simple review of lower court decisions.  Examples of these additional 
responsibilities include review of ballot titles, certain agency determinations, legislative apportionment, 
and attorney discipline proceedings.  Despite the additional burdens placed on the system, the appellate 
court structure has remained largely unchanged for over thirty years.  For Oregon’s appellate courts to 
operate effectively in the twenty- first century, some changes to the current system are certainly in order. 
 
  The purpose of this Essay is to urge the Oregon legislature to undertake an in-depth review of Oregon’s 
appellate court system, with an aim toward increasing judicial efficiency and reducing *478 delays and 
costs.  The Essay first traces the history of Oregon’s appellate courts, including such milestones as the 
establishment of the Oregon Supreme Court in 1857, the 1910 initiative that provided the foundation for 
Oregon’s current judicial system, and the creation of the Oregon Court of Appeals in 1969.  It then 
summarizes the current jurisdiction of both the court of appeals and the supreme court, and provides 
recent judicial statistics detailing the volume and types of cases filed in both courts.  Next, the Essay 
identifies increasing delays and costs as the primary threats to justice in Oregon’s appellate courts, and 
analyzes four notable cases that illustrate some of the problems found in the current system.  Finally, it 
concludes by offering various reform proposals designed to reduce the significant delays and costs 




Oregon’s Judicial Branch: Beginnings and Evolution 
 
A. The Constitutional Convention of 1857 
 
  Oregon’s constitutional convention opened on August 17, 1857, at the Marion County Courthouse in 
Salem. [FN1]  The delegates elected Matthew P. Deady, a member of the Oregon Territorial Supreme 
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Court and delegate from Douglas County, to serve as the convention’s president. [FN2]  Organizational 
matters dominated the convention’s early sessions. [FN3]  The structure of the judicial branch was the 
first major issue considered by the delegates, and debate over the proposed judicial article lasted for 
nearly an entire week. [FN4]  The debate centered largely on arcane issues, including the jurisdiction of 
the various courts, structure *479 of grand juries, and terms and number of supreme court judges. [FN5]  
Despite the relatively unremarkable contents of the proposed judicial article, significant anti- judicial 
sentiment existed among the delegates.  For example, Multnomah County delegate David Logan called 
the proposed article “a bill of abominations, a running sore designed to suck out the substance of the 
people.” [FN6] Thomas Dryer, a delegate from Multnomah and Washington Counties, claimed that the 
article created a “judicial monarchy” and vigorously argued that the determination of factual and legal 
issues should rest with juries, not judges. [FN7] 
 
  The judicial article ultimately adopted by the convention, which appeared as article VII of the Oregon 
Constitution of 1857, was largely unremarkable.  It created a state supreme court consisting of four 
justices chosen from separate districts. [FN8]  The article also permitted the legislature to increase the 
number of supreme court justices, but mandated that the number of justices “shall not exceed five until 
the white population of the State shall amount to One Hundred Thousand, and shall never exceed 
seven.” [FN9]  All judges chosen under the new constitution would serve six-year terms and be eligible 
for reelection. [FN10]  The supreme court’s jurisdiction was limited to revising decisions of the circuit 
courts. [FN11]  Supreme court justices also acted as trial judges in the circuit court, but could not hear 
appeals in cases where they served as the trial judge. [FN12]  The original article VII gave the 
legislature the power, once Oregon’s “white population” reached 200,000, to provide for the separate 
election of supreme court and circuit court judges. [FN13]  Three of those judges would serve 
exclusively as supreme court justices. [FN14]  Judges could be removed for cause by a two-thirds vote 
of each house of the legislature. [FN15]  With little fanfare, Oregonians approved the new constitution 
in a special election held November 9, 1857, by a vote of 7,195 *480 to 3,215. [FN16] 
 
B. Current Structure of the Oregon Judicial Department 
 
1. The 1910 Initiative 
 
  The original judicial department article approved in 1857 was almost completely revised by a voter 
initiative in 1910.  In many ways, the 1910 initiative laid the groundwork for Oregon’s current judicial 
system.  The current version of article VII provides that “[t]he judicial power of the state shall be vested 
in one supreme court and in such other courts as may from time to time be created by law.” [FN17]  
Article VII thus gives the legislature the power to create courts inferior to the supreme court.  Supreme 
court justices are now elected in statewide elections for six-year terms, and the legislature is prohibited 
from lowering the compensation of sitting judges. [FN18] 
 
  In addition to revamping the structure of Oregon’s judiciary, the 1910 initiative substantially revised 
the supreme court’s jurisdiction.  The supreme court retained jurisdiction over appeals from the circuit 
courts, and gained original jurisdiction in mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus proceedings. 
[FN19]  Supreme court justices were required to affirm the decisions of lower courts, despite the 




  The amended version of article VII approved in 1910 repealed original  article VII only to the extent 
that the two articles conflicted with each other. [FN21]  Section 2 of amended article VII provided that 
original article VII “shall remain as at present constituted until otherwise provided by law.” [FN22]  
Thus, amended article VII effectively classified original article VII as a statute, subject to change by 
legislative enactments.  For example, since amended article VII does not address the number of supreme 
*481 court justices, the legislature could increase the number beyond the seven provided for in original 
article VII. [FN23] 
 
  2. Legislative Modification of the Supreme Court’s Jurisdiction 
 
  Because the supreme court’s jurisdiction is set out in original article VII, not amended article VII, the 
legislature has the power to alter the court’s jurisdiction (except that section 2 of amended article VII 
prohibits the legislature from depriving the supreme court of original jurisdiction over mandamus, quo 
warranto, and habeas corpus proceedings). [FN24]  Not surprisingly, the legislature has changed the 
jurisdiction of the supreme court considerably since 1910.  The supreme court’s primary function today 
is the discretionary review of decisions of the Oregon Court of Appeals. [FN25] 
 
  In addition to review of lower court decisions, the legislature has also seen fit to give the supreme court 
jurisdiction over a wide range of other matters. The supreme court currently has original jurisdiction not 
only in the matters specified in amended article VII, but also in ballot title review, [FN26] challenges to 
financial impact statements accompanying ballot measures, [FN27] challenges to ballot measure 
explanatory statements, [FN28] reapportionment of congressional and legislative districts, [FN29] 
determinations of judicial fitness, [FN30] and attorney discipline cases. [FN31]  In addition, the supreme 
court has direct review (bypassing the court of appeals) in death penalty cases, [FN32] appeals from 
decisions of the Oregon Tax Court, [FN33] decisions of the Energy Facility Siting Council, [FN34] 
challenges to proposed prison sites, [FN35] certain constitutional challenges *482 to state ballot 
measures, [FN36] and certified questions from other state and federal courts. [FN37]  The supreme court 
is also responsible for determining whether attorneys are qualified for admission or reinstatement to the 
Oregon State Bar. [FN38] 
 
  3. Establishment of the Oregon Court of Appeals 
 
  As Oregon’s population grew during the first half of the twentieth century, the workload of the Oregon 
Supreme Court increased in kind.  In an effort to expedite appellate decision-making, the supreme court 
sometimes heard cases in “departments” of three justices.  During the 1950s, however, civil litigants 
routinely encountered delays of two to three years between the date of judgment in the trial court and 
final disposition by the supreme court. [FN39]  These delays led the Oregon State Bar, in a 1956 
resolution, to declare that “‘the problem of delay on appeals to the Oregon Supreme Court is one of the 
most serious problems confronting the administration of justice in Oregon at the present time.”‘ [FN40]  
Around this time, the idea of an intermediate appellate court began to surface, but early proposals for 
such a court found little support. [FN41]  In 1957, the Legislative Interim Committee on Judicial 
Administration specifically recommended against creating an intermediate court, citing higher costs, 
increased delay, and jurisdictional difficulties. [FN42]  The committee instead urged an increase in the 
number of supreme court justices to nine, encouraged the supreme court to decide more cases in three-
judge departments, and suggested that the supreme court appoint circuit judges and retired supreme 




  By the mid-1960s, despite following the Committee’s recommendations regarding the increased use of 
temporary judges and three-judge departments, the supreme court saw its workload reach overwhelming 
proportions.  Around this time, legislative proposals for an intermediate appellate court gained 
momentum.  *483 During the 1969 session, the legislature for the first time actively considered a 
proposal for an intermediate appellate court.  The bill, H.B. 1195, proposed a five-member intermediate 
appellate court with jurisdiction over criminal, probate, and domestic relations cases, as well as appeals 
from decisions of administrative agencies. [FN44]  The bill also provided for discretionary review of the 
intermediate court’s decisions by the supreme court. [FN45]  The legislature heard testimony in support 
of H.B. 1195 from Chief Justice William C. Perry, Justice Ralph M. Holman, Governor Tom McCall’s 
legal counsel, and future supreme court justices Hans Linde and Jacob Tanzer, among others. [FN46]  
According to these witnesses, the increased workload of the supreme court resulted from the United 
States Supreme Court’s holding that a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to at least one appeal. 
[FN47]  Senator Berkeley Lent, who later served as chief justice of the Oregon Supreme Court from 
1982 to 1983, and other legislators opposed H.B. 1195, arguing that it would lead to increased costs and 
inefficiency. [FN48]  Ultimately, the legislature passed, and Governor McCall signed, H.B. 1195 
essentially as introduced, creating what is today the Oregon Court of Appeals. [FN49] 
 
  4. Increases in the Size and Workload of the Court of Appeals 
 
  Within a short time, legislators enhanced both the size and jurisdiction of the court of appeals.  The 
1973 legislature increased the number of judges on the court from five to six. [FN50]  Two significant 
changes to the court of appeals occurred in 1977.  First, the size of the court was increased to its current 
number of ten judges. [FN51]  Second, the legislature gave the court of appeals exclusive jurisdiction 
over all appeals, except in cases where the Oregon Constitution or statutory law confers original 
jurisdiction on *484 the supreme court. [FN52]  Once the court of appeals issues a decision, an 
aggrieved party may petition the supreme court for review. [FN53]  Legislation enacted in 1981 also 
authorizes the court of appeals to certify appeals to the supreme court, and the supreme court may accept 
or reject such appeals. [FN54] 
 
  5. Summary 
 
  In sum, Oregon’s present appellate court structure, which provides for the discretionary review of 
intermediate court decisions by the supreme court, in many ways mirrors our federal court system.  The 
Oregon Court of Appeals, as the state’s intermediate appellate court, has exclusive jurisdiction over 
most appeals with a few notable exceptions.  The most prominent of these exceptions include appeals 
from death sentences, review of decisions of the Oregon Tax Court, and mandamus proceedings.  These 
matters bypass the court of appeals and proceed directly to the Oregon Supreme Court for review.  A 
litigant aggrieved by a court of appeals decision may petition for review in the supreme court, but the 
supreme court has discretion to accept or deny the petition.  The supreme court also has the statutory 
duty to review a host of other matters, the most prominent being challenges to initiative ballot titles, 






The Current State of Affairs 
 
A. Court of Appeals 
 
  Although the judicial statistics currently available are somewhat inconsistent and contradictory, they do 
provide a basic window into the current state of Oregon’s appellate court system. [FN55]  At present, 
approximately 4,000 cases are filed each year in the court of appeals, and the court annually closes about 
the same number of cases. 
 
*485 Cases Filed in the Oregon Court of Appeals, 1997-2001 
 







  Criminal appeals, habeas corpus, parole review, and post-conviction cases usually account for slightly 
more than half of the total cases closed each year.  Review of agency determinations make up another 
ten to fifteen percent of the court’s cases, about half of which are appeals from the decisions of the 
Workers’ Compensation Board.  The remainder of the court’s caseload consists primarily of ordinary 
civil, domestic relations, juvenile, and termination-of- parental-rights cases.  The court of appeals may 
certify cases directly to the supreme court, but certification by the court of appeals and acceptance of the 
certification by the supreme court is rare.  The supreme court has not issued a written opinion in a case 
certified to it by the court of appeals since October 1998. [FN56] 
 
B. Supreme Court 
 
  The supreme court annually receives around 800 petitions for review of court of appeals decisions, and 
in a typical year grants review in between five and ten percent of those cases. 
 
Petitions for Review in the Oregon Supreme Court, 1997-2001 
 
Year Petitions Filed Petitions Allowed 
1997 796 70 
1998 958 59 
1999 862 58 
2000 767 83 




  *486 In addition to its discretionary review function, the supreme court receives another 250 cases or 
so on direct review.  Approximately one-third of these cases are applications for writs of mandamus that 
the court decides without published opinion.  Each year, the supreme court authors approximately 100 
published opinions.  The number of ballot titles reviewed by the supreme court continues to increase, 
and ballot titles now annually account for somewhere between twenty-five and thirty-five percent of the 
supreme court’s total number of written opinions.  The supreme court typically decides less than five 
death penalty cases each year, although these opinions are usually lengthy and involve numerous issues.  
Attorney discipline proceedings annually account for another ten to fifteen written opinions.  The 
supreme court also writes opinions in approximately ten cases appealed from the tax court each year.  
Thus, in recent years, discretionary review cases make up on average around half of the supreme court’s 




Troubleshooting Oregon’s Appellate Court System: The Problems of Delay and Cost 
 
  The current state and effectiveness of Oregon’s appellate court system was the focus of an April 2001 
seminar sponsored by the Oregon Law Institute. At the seminar, judges and practicing attorneys alike 
expressed concern over various characteristics of Oregon’s appellate system.  In preparation for this 
Essay, we solicited responses to a set of questions regarding Oregon’s appellate courts from 
approximately twenty members of the Oregon State Bar. The questions are set forth in Appendix 1.  A 
variety of attorneys, including retired supreme court, court of appeals, and circuit court judges, provided 
responses, as did a number of distinguished lawyers with experience litigating in Oregon’s appellate 
courts.  Their responses were widely varied.  Many respondents identified problems in Oregon’s present 
appellate court system and offered suggestions for improvement. 
 
A. Concerns of Judges and Lawyers 
 
  The one area of concern common to nearly all seminar participants and survey respondents was the 
increasing amount of delay and high costs presently experienced by litigants in Oregon’s appellate *487 
courts.  A strong general sentiment appears to exist among the bench and bar in favor of lessening both 
the time and costs associated with appellate litigation.  In 1956, the Oregon State Bar viewed the two- to 
three-year delays common in the system at that time as a serious threat to justice. [FN57]  Forty-six 
years later, the time currently required for a case to fully wind its way through Oregon’s appellate court 
system has increased substantially.  Litigants in civil cases today must often spend four years or more in 
Oregon’s appellate courts before they receive a final judgment. [FN58]  The cost of litigation under 
Oregon’s two-step appellate system also continues to rise.  A recent advertisement in the Oregon State 
Bar Bulletin offered to prepare a petition for review in the supreme court for $2,500, exclusive of costs. 
[FN59] However, according to experienced appellate attorneys at two Portland, Oregon, law firms, 
Miller Nash and Stoel Rives, the total cost of petitioning for supreme court review in an average 
commercial dispute is significantly higher. They estimate that the attorney fees associated with 
preparing a petition for review in such cases amount to at least $10,000, and litigants can plan to spend 
an additional $10,000 or more if the supreme court grants the petition. [FN60]  These amounts are in 




B. Some Recent Cases 
 
  Several recent, notable decisions from Oregon’s appellate courts provide real-life illustrations of these 
concerns.  Of course, some may urge that these cases be classified as atypical.  Nevertheless, they raise 
some very important questions about the effectiveness of Oregon’s current appellate court system. 
 
  1. McCathern v. Toyota Motor Corp. 
 
  In McCathern v. Toyota Motor Corp., [FN61] Linda McCathern sustained serious physical injuries in 
an accident involving a Toyota automobile.  The accident left McCathern a quadriplegic, and she *488 
filed suit against Toyota alleging that the vehicle’s design was defective.  In 1997, a jury awarded 
McCathern $7.6 million in damages.  Toyota appealed the jury’s verdict, and the court of appeals 
affirmed the jury’s award in March 1999.  Toyota then petitioned the supreme court to review the 
decision of the court of appeals. The supreme court agreed to review the case, heard oral argument, and 
in May 2001, nearly four years after the jury’s verdict and six years after McCathern’s catastrophic 
accident, affirmed the decision of the court of appeals.  According to lawyers familiar with the case, the 
supreme court’s decision clarified confusion regarding the standard of review for punitive damage 
awards. [FN62]  Had the court of appeals certified this case of statewide significance directly to the 
supreme court under ORS 19.405, McCathern would have received compensation for her injuries at least 
two years earlier.  In addition, the decision to forgo certification of the case to the supreme court forced 
Oregonians to wait an additional two years for clarification of the appropriate standards for assessing the 
validity of punitive damage awards. 
 
  2. Doe v. State 
 
  Another instance of the detrimental effects of delay on litigants in our current appellate system is the 
case of Doe v. State, [FN63] the legal challenge to Measure 58, Oregon’s landmark adoption rights law 
passed by voters in November 1998.  Measure 58 gave adult adoptees born in Oregon, for the first time, 
the right to see their original birth certificates. [FN64]  It clearly was controversial, highly publicized, 
supported and opposed by numerous organizations both within and outside the state, and undoubtedly 
headed for a groundbreaking, statewide decision by Oregon’s highest court.  In August 1999, the trial 
court rejected the claims of six anonymous birth mothers that the law violated their constitutional rights 
of contract and privacy.  The mothers appealed, and instead of certifying the case to the supreme court 
for a decision, the court of appeals heard oral arguments and issued a written opinion affirming the trial 
court in December 1999.  But this decision was not the end of the case.  The court of appeals then *489 
issued a seven-day stay preventing the law from taking effect while the mothers petitioned for review by 
the supreme court.  The supreme court extended the stay indefinitely while it considered the petition, 
and ultimately denied the mothers’ petition for review on March 21, 2000.  Nearly two months later, on 
May 16, 2000, the supreme court declined to reconsider its decision, but permitted the stay to remain in 
place while the mothers sought relief in the United States Supreme Court.  The Supreme Court 
subsequently denied the mothers’ claims, and Measure 58 finally took effect in June 2000.  For eighteen 
months after Oregon voters approved Measure 58, over 2,000 adoptees seeking relief under the law were 
denied access to their birth records.  Clearly, if this bellwether legal proceeding had bypassed the court 
of appeals and gone directly to the Oregon Supreme Court, those 2,000 adoptees would have known 
their birth parents’ names months earlier and been spared the substantial emotional costs arising from 
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the delay.  The litigants would have also avoided the additional time and cost associated with preparing 
a petition for review in the supreme court. 
 
  3. Lakin v. Senco Products, Inc. 
 
  The problems of increased delay and high costs are further illustrated by Lakin v. Senco Products, Inc., 
[FN65] the case that invalidated Oregon’s statutory cap on noneconomic damages.  In 1987, the Oregon 
legislature imposed a $500,000 cap on noneconomic damage awards. [FN66]  John Lakin was working 
with a nail gun in December 1990 when the gun misfired, sending a nail into his brain.  The accident left 
Lakin with severe brain damage and partial paralysis.  A jury in February 1994 awarded Lakin $9.3 
million in damages, including $2 million in noneconomic damages for pain and suffering.  The jury also 
awarded Lakin’s wife $876,000 in noneconomic damages for loss of consortium.  In accordance with 
the statutory cap, the trial judge reduced the noneconomic damage awards to $500,000 each.  The court 
of appeals held the cap unconstitutional and reinstated the jury’s awards in October 1996, and the 
manufacturer of the nail gun subsequently sought review in the supreme court. Almost three *490 years 
later, and more than five years after the jury’s verdict, the supreme court affirmed the decision of the 
court of appeals on different grounds.  Given the statewide import of the pain-and-suffering damages 
cap, few doubted that the supreme court would ultimately decide the case.  Certification of this case 
directly to the supreme court would have provided Lakin much-needed compensation in a more timely 
fashion and expedited a final ruling on an issue of statewide constitutional significance. 
 
  4. Smothers v. Gresham Transfer, Inc. 
 
  Smothers v. Gresham Transfer, Inc., [FN67] a recent case concerning the constitutionality of Oregon’s 
workers’ compensation scheme, provides a final example of the time-consuming and costly nature of 
our present appellate system.  Terry Smothers, a lube technician for a Gresham trucking company, 
contracted a respiratory infection in 1993 that developed into pneumonia. Smothers quit his job and filed 
a workers’ compensation claim in 1994, which his former employer’s insurer denied.  The Workers’ 
Compensation Board upheld the denial, and the court of appeals affirmed the decision without opinion. 
Smothers then filed a negligence action against his former employer in May 1995.  The trial court 
dismissed Smothers’ claim on grounds that the workers’ compensation statutory scheme was his sole 
remedy, and the court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment in July 1997.  The supreme court 
agreed to review the case in November 1998.  Two and one-half years later, in May 2001, the supreme 
court reversed the decision of the court of appeals and held that denying a worker the right to sue for on-
the-job injuries violated the Oregon Constitution.  As a constitutional challenge to Oregon’s long-
standing workers’ compensation system, the case had the potential to, and ultimately did, affect 
thousands of Oregon workers and businesses.  Further, the significant and far- reaching constitutional 
issues raised in the case were clearly worthy of expedited consideration by the Oregon Supreme Court.  
However, nearly six years elapsed between the trial court’s dismissal and the supreme court’s final 






Possible Solutions to the Problems of Delay and Cost 
 
  Members of the bench and bar have proposed a variety of solutions to the lengthy delays and high costs 
presently experienced by litigants in Oregon’s appellate courts.  This Part summarizes and considers the 
merits of various reform proposals. 
 
A. Ballot Measures and the Oregon Supreme Court 
 
  One oft-mentioned reform proposal is the elimination or substantial revision of the supreme court’s 
role in Oregon’s initiative process.  At present, the supreme court directly reviews challenges to 
proposed ballot titles, financial impact statements, and explanatory statements before they appear on the 
ballot.  Of these cases, review of proposed ballot titles places the largest burden on the court.  According 
to Chief Justice Wallace P. Carson, Jr., ballot title review cases are “‘a matter of increasing concern to 
[the supreme court] . . . . These cases have forced us to put our other work aside.”‘ [FN68]  Professor 
Garrett Epps of the University of Oregon School of Law assesses the situation more bluntly, 
characterizing the supreme court’s role in ballot title review as “‘a gigantic waste of effort.”‘ [FN69] 
 
  Indeed, supreme court review of ballot titles, explanatory statements, and financial impact statements 
seems to be an inappropriate task for the judicial branch of government.  Particularly in ballot title 
review cases, the court is often forced to render decisions akin to advisory opinions on matters that are 
likely to come before it in the future, as opposed to adjudicating real legal disputes between parties.  
Furthermore, initiative-related cases unquestionably place a very significant burden on the supreme 
court’s workload, accounting for approximately one-quarter to one-third of the supreme court’s annual 
written opinions. [FN70]  The impact of these cases on the supreme court docket is even greater in 
election years.  In one three-month period, from April through June of 2000, challenges to proposed 
ballot titles constituted twenty-six of the court’s thirty-one rulings. [FN71]  The court consumes *492 
valuable time hearing oral arguments in initiative-related cases and typically must decide them in an 
expedited fashion, which in turn increases the time required for deciding issues of statewide and 
constitutional significance. 
 
  The obvious solution to the supreme court’s initiative dilemma is to completely remove review of 
ballot titles and other initiative-related matters from the judicial branch.  One proposal would give the 
responsibility for writing ballot titles to a neutral citizens panel.  Other possibilities involve altering the 
current process while keeping review of initiative-related cases in the judicial branch.  For instance, the 
legislature could preclude judicial review of ballot titles until proponents gather the signatures required 
to place the initiative on the ballot.  Another option is the enactment of legislation establishing a special 
panel to decide initiative-related suits, perhaps consisting of retired supreme court justices or other 
judges.  Still another possibility involves supreme court arbitration of ballot title disputes, where the 
court would select a ballot title from those submitted by the attorney general and initiative supporters 
and opponents.  Less drastic proposals include requiring the supreme court to decide ballot title 
challenges on the briefs unless the chief petitioner of the measure requests oral argument, and using 




  Delays in Oregon’s appellate system will only increase as long as the supreme court plays a direct role 
in initiative-related cases.  Using one of the above proposals, the legislature should remove direct review 
of ballot titles and other initiative-related cases from the supreme court’s workload. Such action would 
reduce the supreme court’s number of written opinions by at least twenty-five percent and permit the 
court to focus more attention on important statewide legal questions.  Deciding these types of issues, not 
issuing advisory opinions on proposed ballot titles, should be the primary role of Oregon’s highest court. 
 
B. Bypassing the Court of Appeals 
 
1. Certification Under ORS 19.405 
 
  Under ORS 19.405, the court of appeals may certify cases directly to the supreme court for disposition.  
A majority vote of *493 the judges of the court of appeals is required to certify an appeal to the supreme 
court. [FN73]  Likewise, a majority of the supreme court justices considering the case must vote to 
accept a certification. [FN74]  This procedure appears to provide an effective means to expedite 
decisions in cases where ultimate review by the supreme court is likely.  Moreover, since the supreme 
court may reject certification of a case, the certification scheme ensures that the supreme court accepts 
only those cases that are appropriate for its review.  If the supreme court deems a case unworthy of 
certification, it simply returns the case to the court of appeals with no prejudice to the litigants. [FN75] 
 
  As noted previously, certification of cases under ORS 19.405 is extremely rare.  The court of appeals 
seems reluctant to certify cases to the supreme court, with some judges citing the importance of 
sharpening the issues and providing a well-reasoned work product for the supreme court to review. 
[FN76]  The supreme court appears equally reluctant to accept certification in many instances.  
Unfortunately, providing an intermediate decision in almost all cases comes with a price.  In three of the 
four cases discussed in Part III.B, the litigants would have received final dispositions on average two 
years earlier had the case proceeded directly to the supreme court.  These delays are particularly 
problematic in cases where a plaintiff is severely injured and in need of compensation for his or her 
injuries.  For example, in the Smothers case, the injured plaintiff was forced to wait an additional two 
years for the court of appeals to render a decision in a case that was likely headed for a final resolution 
in the supreme court.  More importantly, the lack of certification in cases of statewide significance also 
delays final pronouncements from the supreme court on unsettled areas of the law.  We concur in the 
assessment of one Portland litigator, who stated: “I am frustrated by the inattention to the statute that 
gives the [s]upreme [c]ourt the ability to bypass the [c]ourt of [a]ppeals and take important *494 cases 
directly.  I believe the substantial delays in final outcome under the current two-step process [are] 
unfortunate in these cases.” [FN77] 
 
  2. Modifying the Current Certification Procedure 
 
  A variation on the current certification procedure would permit the supreme court, either by majority 
vote or by action of the chief justice under his power as the head of the Oregon Judicial Department, 
[FN78] to assert jurisdiction over any case on appeal that concerns issues of statewide or constitutional 
significance.  The benefits of such an approach are the same as the ones associated with the current 
certification procedure, namely, that speedy clarification of the law benefits the bench, bar, and litigants.  
Since the current procedure requires both the court of appeals and the supreme court to approve 
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certification, permitting the supreme court to unilaterally determine certification would most likely 
increase the number of cases bypassing the court of appeals. 
 
  Placing certification solely in the hands of the supreme court would undoubtedly speed the final 
disposition of some cases, but loosening the current requirements of ORS 19.405 raises several potential 
problems. First, allowing a single body or individual to control the fate of certification increases the 
likelihood that political considerations will enter the process.  The justices of the supreme court could 
also find themselves mired in time-consuming disputes over whether a particular case should bypass the 
court of appeals.  Finally, the effectiveness of any plan to increase the number of cases proceeding 
directly to the supreme court depends on a corresponding reduction in the court’s current caseload.  
Increased use of the current certification procedure by both courts, as opposed to unilateral certification 
by the supreme court, would appear to be a more desirable approach. 
 
C. Limiting Supreme Court Review in Certain Cases 
 
  Another possible solution to the existing delays and high costs in Oregon’s appellate system is to limit 
supreme court review to *495 certain cases. Oregon Supreme Court Justice Susan M. Leeson recently 
stated: “‘[The supreme] court is primarily a law announcing court.  If someone asks us to review a case 
from the [c]ourt of [a]ppeals merely to correct an error, the [supreme court] is unlikely to take that 
case.”‘ [FN79]  Justice Leeson’s comments suggest that review by the supreme court is highly unlikely 
in cases involving alleged errors in the application of statutory rules.  But under the current system, the 
court must still expend valuable time and resources to consider petitions for review in such cases.  The 
costs are also high to the litigant who prevails in the court of appeals in these types of cases.  Despite the 
slim chance of review by the supreme court, the prevailing party in the court of appeals must incur the 
cost of responding to the petition for review and wait another year or more for a final disposition. 
 
  1. Creating Finality to Decisions of the Court of Appeals 
 
  Several proposals, similar in nature, would address these concerns and increase the efficiency of the 
existing appellate system.  One option is for the legislature to make decisions of the court of appeals 
final in certain cases arising out of statutes, such as workers’ compensation and domestic relations cases.  
An additional proposal would vest final jurisdiction over all statutory questions, regardless of type, in 
the court of appeals.  The supreme court would still have final jurisdiction over any constitutional issues 
under either option.  For example, if a litigant challenged the constitutionality of a domestic relations 
statute, a party aggrieved by a court of appeals decision could petition the supreme court for review. 
 
  Removing the supreme court from the realm of statutory interpretation in certain cases would 
undoubtedly speed final disposition and dramatically reduce the approximately 800 petitions for review 
received by the court each year.  However, this approach would take from the supreme court a long-
standing and important power of most state high courts, namely, the final interpretation of untested 
statutory provisions. [FN80]  Another obvious *496 problem with giving the court of appeals final 
jurisdiction over all or some statutory claims is the confusion that would result in cases containing both 
statutory and constitutional or common law issues.  The following hypothetical case of an employee 
who suffers sexual harassment in the workplace illustrates this problem.  The employee’s case will 
likely consist of statutory and common law claims: a civil rights violation claim under ORS chapter 659 
and common law claims for assault and battery.  In such cases, either the issues would be split between 
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two different courts, or one of the two courts would be arbitrarily given final jurisdiction.  Both of these 
options increase the likelihood of conflicting decisions, and could result in the inclusion of frivolous 
claims in order to obtain appellate review in a particular court. 
 
  2. A Caveat to Supreme Court Review 
 
  One interesting proposal, based in part on the current system, would place the issue of finality largely 
in the hands of the litigants.  Under this approach, most cases, except those proceeding directly to the 
supreme court for review, would continue to be filed in the court of appeals.  At the time of filing in the 
court of appeals, both parties would have the option of including a preliminary statement identifying 
issues that warrant consideration by the supreme court.  If both parties decline to include such a 
statement, the court of appeals could still certify the case directly to the supreme court under ORS 
19.405.  In the event neither the parties nor the court of appeals requests a decision from the supreme 
court, the decision of the court of appeals would be final.  Similarly, the decision of the court of appeals 
would also be final if the supreme court declined certification. 
 
  This proposal is attractive for several reasons.  First, it would significantly reduce the delay and cost 
associated with the current two-step appellate system.  A litigant would prepare a single brief and 
undergo a single oral argument, which would result in a considerable reduction of time and expense.  
Second, in contrast to reform proposals that would make court of appeals decisions final in all cases of a 
certain type, this system would appropriately retain the supreme court as the final authority on all 
questions of Oregon law.  Third, imposition of this system could easily be achieved within the existing 
appellate framework, requiring a relatively low degree of legislative action.  The only drawback of this 
approach is the possibility of an increase in the supreme *497 court’s workload, which would result if 
the number of requests for a supreme court decision exceeded the current number of petitions for 
review.  Considering the number of petitions for review that the supreme court currently receives, this 
proposal would most likely result in an insubstantial additional burden on the supreme court.  
Furthermore, regardless of any increase in the workload of the supreme court, this proposal would 
undoubtedly reduce the overall burden on Oregon’s appellate court system. 
 
  3. Limiting Petitions for Review Through Attorney Fees Awards 
 
  Imposing a sanction of attorney fees on litigants who unsuccessfully seek review in the supreme court 
is another way to reduce the current number of petitions for review.  The basis for this approach is that 
litigants will think twice before unnecessarily prolonging appeals because of the possibility of paying 
the opposing party’s attorney fees.  Reducing the workload of the supreme court is certainly a desirable 
goal, but providing for attorney fees awards also has some serious side effects.  Deterring petitions for 
review through attorney fees awards would likely chill the development of Oregon’s common law.  
Litigants would be far less likely to pursue untested claims knowing that they might incur thousands of 
dollars in additional legal fees. Along these lines, such a system would strongly favor litigants with 
substantial resources who are able to assume the risks of a fees award. Awarding attorney fees in these 
cases also has the potential to decrease the stature of the supreme court, since review of court of appeals 
decisions would occur only when a litigant seeks review in the supreme court.  Lastly, the supreme court 
might expend valuable time and resources in petty disputes over the reasonableness of petitions for 
attorney fees.  In light of these concerns, reform of the current two-step structure, rather than punitive 




  4. Review of Tax Court Decisions 
 
  Appeals from judgments of the Oregon Tax Court presently bypass the court of appeals and proceed 
directly to the supreme court.  The supreme court must render a final decision in these cases, and they 
are not subject to the petition process.  In most *498 years, tax cases account for less than fifteen of the 
court’s written opinions. [FN81]  However, as the supreme court authors only around 100 opinions each 
year, any modification of the supreme court’s current role in appeals from the tax court could help 
reduce the court’s overall workload. 
 
  Some suggest that the tax court, as a court with specialized and technical expertise, should be a court of 
last resort except for cases involving constitutional issues.  However, since the tax court is essentially a 
trial court, its decisions, like those of the circuit courts, should be subject to at least one layer of 
nondiscretionary appellate review.  The court of appeals, as opposed to the supreme court, appears to be 
the more appropriate place for initial review of tax appeals.  With few exceptions, the court of appeals 
decides initial appeals in almost all civil cases.  Moreover, the court of appeals has appellate jurisdiction 
in other cases of a specialized, technical nature, such as appeals from the Workers’ Compensation Board 
and Land Use Board of Appeals.  Therefore, for purposes of clarity and consistency, the court of appeals 
should possibly have initial jurisdiction over appeals from the tax court, with discretionary review by the 
supreme court only in cases involving issues of constitutional or statewide significance. 
 
  5. Attorney Discipline Proceedings 
 
  We share the view of most lawyers that the supreme court, as the body ultimately responsible for 
admitting attorneys to practice in Oregon, should retain its current role as the ultimate arbiter of attorney 
discipline. Although the number of attorney discipline cases is not overly burdensome, they often 
generate lengthy written opinions and involve time-consuming factual investigation and analysis.  Any 
reduction in the number of attorney discipline opinions would therefore provide the court with additional 
time to decide important legal issues.  To reduce the number of discipline cases that require a final 
disposition from the supreme court, the legislature should require mandatory mediation when the case is 
filed in the supreme court.  Providing for mandatory mediation in discipline cases will not eliminate 
attorney discipline cases from the supreme court’s docket, but such action will provide the court with 
additional time to expend in other areas. 
 
  *499 6. Death Penalty Review 
 
  Given the gravity of the issue at stake, direct review of death sentences appropriately lies in the 
supreme court.  Furthermore, death penalty cases, like tax appeals and attorney discipline cases, do not 
generate a significant number of supreme court opinions.  But these cases typically involve dozens of 
assignments of error and constitutional issues, and therefore place a significant burden on the supreme 
court’s overall workload.  Currently, the supreme court automatically reviews death sentences regardless 
of the defendant’s desire to appeal.  One possibility for lessening the time spent by the court on death 
penalty cases is to eliminate “automatic” review.  Under this approach, the supreme court would still 
directly review death sentences, but only if the defendant seeks appellate review.  The obvious concern 
regarding elimination of automatic review is the possibility that defendants sentenced to death may not 
be properly informed of their right to direct review by the supreme court.  A simple solution to this 
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dilemma is for the trial judge to conduct a hearing following issuance of a death sentence, where the 
judge informs the defendant of the appeal process and determines on the record whether the defendant is 
capable of deciding whether to appeal.  If the judge determines that the defendant lacks the mental 
capacity required to make an informed decision regarding an appeal, the supreme court would 
automatically review the case. 
 
D. Changes in the Court of Appeals 
 
  Thus far, the reforms suggested in this Essay have focused on reducing the delays and costs associated 
with review in the supreme court.  For the vast majority of cases, however, the court of appeals is the 
first stop in Oregon’s appellate court system.  Any complete study of the system therefore must also 
examine whether any changes are warranted in the structure or procedures of the court of appeals. 
 
  1. Increasing the Number of Judges 
 
  Approximately 4,000 cases are filed annually in the court of appeals.  The court, usually in three-judge 
panels, hears oral argument in all cases if requested by the parties, and must render a final decision in 
every case. [FN82]  In light of the large number of filings, *500 the speed with which the ten judges of 
the court of appeals operate is remarkable.  But these speedy dispositions may soon be a thing of the past 
if Oregon continues to grow at its present rate.  The number of judges on the court of appeals has 
remained constant since 1977, yet Oregon’s population has increased by approximately thirty percent 
since 1980. [FN83]  If current trends continue, the population will swell to 4,350,000 by 2025, an 
increase of approximately twenty-seven percent. [FN84]  The legislature should therefore evaluate 
whether increasing the number of judges will permit the court to continue its efficient ways.  Many 
judges believe that an increase in the court’s size will diminish collegiality.  Others maintain that adding 
another panel to the court of appeals will yield inconsistent decisions and increase the number of cases 
referred to the full court for en banc dispositions. [FN85]  These concerns are certainly valid, but the 
addition of one three-judge panel will most likely have a minor effect on collaborative decision-making 
and the number of en banc cases.  Moreover, the resulting increase in productivity clearly outweighs any 
of the minor drawbacks associated with adding an additional panel to the court of appeals. 
 
  2. Review of Administrative Decisions 
 
  Each year, the court of appeals closes approximately 500 appeals from administrative agencies and 
other quasi-judicial bodies. [FN86]  An additional option for reducing the court of appeals’ workload is 
to remove these appeals from the court’s jurisdiction.  Proponents of this approach argue that agency 
review should not lie with a generalist appellate court, mainly because these cases are highly fact-
specific and involve basic application of statutory schemes.  However, a strong majority of the attorneys 
surveyed favored subjecting administrative decisions to at least one level *501 of judicial review.  If the 
legislature decides that judicial review of certain agency determinations continues to be appropriate, 
then perhaps the court of appeals should be the court of last resort for administrative appeals.  Any 
initial judicial review should probably remain with the court of appeals, as opposed to the circuit court, 




  3. Streamlining Post-Conviction Appeals 
 
  Consider the following hypothetical scenario.  A criminal defendant is convicted after a trial in circuit 
court.  The defendant appeals the conviction to the court of appeals, which affirms the trial court’s 
judgment.  Following the decision of the court of appeals, the defendant appeals a second time and 
petitions for review in the supreme court.  The supreme court declines to review the case.  After a trial 
and two bites of the appellate apple, including review by Oregon’s highest court, most casual observers 
would conclude that the defendant’s conviction was final.  But an entirely separate round of appeals 
awaits the defendant in this case.  The defendant may also seek relief in a separate post-conviction 
proceeding, usually by filing a petition in the circuit court located at the defendant’s place of 
incarceration.  Most defendants who seek post-conviction relief in this fashion allege that their trial 
attorneys failed to adequately defend them.  These post-conviction proceedings then wind their way 
from the circuit court, to the court of appeals, and ultimately to the supreme court. 
 
  Streamlining these post-conviction appeals is another possibility for reducing the workload of Oregon’s 
appellate courts.  One option is to require defendants to file post-conviction appeals at the same time 
they file their initial appeals.  This approach would protect the right of criminal defendants to pursue 
post-conviction relief, and at the same time eliminate an additional round of appeals stemming from the 
same case.  Defendants would assert post- conviction claims at the same time they appealed their 
conviction, and the appellate courts would decide both issues in a single proceeding.  Considering that 
post-conviction appeals presently account for over 200 filings each year in the court of appeals, and over 
100 petitions for review in the supreme court, consolidation of these cases would result in a noticeable 
reduction *502 of the appellate caseload. [FN87]  Critics of this proposal will argue that consolidation 
hampers the ability of criminal defendants to bring post-conviction claims, since most criminal appeals 
must be filed within thirty days after entry of judgment. [FN88]  A possible response to this concern is 
to increase the number of days in which a criminal defendant may file a notice of appeal.  We conclude 
that the legislature should take steps to streamline duplicitous criminal appeals, and at the same time 





  There is no simple or single solution to the challenges currently facing Oregon’s appellate courts.  
Several reforms, all of which may be accomplished within the current system, will help alleviate the 
delays and high costs experienced by many litigants.  First and foremost, the legislature should 
reconsider the supreme court’s role in ballot title review.  Elimination of initiative-related cases from the 
supreme court docket will permit the court to dispose of actual judicial controversies in a more speedy 
fashion.  Short of completely removing these cases from the supreme court, the legislature and the court 
should also explore other options in this area, including the assignment of initiative-related suits to a 
panel of retired judges and mandatory arbitration.  To increase efficiency and speed pronouncements in 
important areas of the law, the supreme court and the court of appeals should both make greater use of 
the current certification procedure.  Other modifications, such as requiring mediation in attorney 
discipline cases and giving death penalty defendants the option of appealing directly to the supreme 
court, will also help lessen present burdens on the supreme court’s time.  The legislature should also 
carefully evaluate the merits and drawbacks of the various proposals aimed at reducing the number of 
petitions for review in the supreme court.  To further promote efficiency and promptness in the decision-
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making processes of both appellate courts, consideration should also be given to adding another panel to 
the court of appeals and streamlining post-conviction appeals.  Lastly, in addition to considering 
modifications to the existing system, the legislature should also evaluate whether substantial *503 
changes in the jurisdiction, structure, and procedures of Oregon’s appellate courts are also warranted. 
 
  The time has clearly arrived for the legislature to take a serious look at Oregon’s appellate court 
system. Any changes to the current system should enhance judicial efficiency and decision-making, and 
at the same time reduce the lengthy amount of time and high costs associated with litigating in the 
appellate courts.  The proposals suggested in this Essay are structured to accomplish these goals.  Some 
of these proposals involve only minor changes to the existing system, while others would result in a 
complete overhaul of the appellate court structure.  Regardless of the path chosen, the legislature should 
act now to ensure that Oregon’s appellate courts are able to dispense justice fairly and efficiently well 
into the twenty-first century. 
 
*504 Appendix 1 
 
OREGON APPELLATE COURT SYSTEM QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
  1. Should the Oregon legislature revise or eliminate the Oregon Supreme Court’s current role in (a) 
ballot title review and (b) attorney discipline cases? 
 
  2. Should the Oregon Tax Court be the “court of last resort” in cases arising under Oregon’s tax laws 
that do not raise federal or state constitutional questions? 
 
  3. Should the jurisdiction of the Oregon Court of Appeals encompass review of Land Use Board of 
Appeals (LUBA) decisions and Workers’ Compensation Board orders? 
 
  4. Should appeals in cases that raise unsettled constitutional issues and other issues of a statewide 
significance bypass the court of appeals and go directly to the supreme court?  How might the legislature 
effect such a system? 
 
  5. Should the legislature take steps to alter the number of judges on the supreme court or court of 
appeals?  If any modifications to the current system result in a greater workload for the supreme court, 
should the court hear cases in three-judge panels? 
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[FN1]. The Oregon Constitution and Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention of 1857, 
at 27 (Charles Henry Carey ed., 1926) [hereinafter The Oregon Constitution and Proceedings]. 
 
[FN2]. Id. at 65.  At the time of Oregon’s statehood in 1859, voters elected Deady to the new state 
supreme court.  Ralph James Mooney, The Deady Years: 1859-1893, in The First Duty: A History of the 
U.S. District Court for Oregon 63, 64 (Carolyn M. Buan ed., 1993).  Deady declined the state court seat 
and instead accepted President James Buchanan’s appointment as Oregon’s first federal district judge.  
Id. 
 
[FN3]. David Schuman, The Creation of the Oregon Constitution, 74 Or. L. Rev. 611, 619 (1995). 
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[FN19]. Id. § 2. 
 
[FN20]. Id. § 3 (amended 1974& 1996).  For thoughtful and contrasting analyses of article VII, section 
3, of the Oregon Constitution, adopted as part of the 1910 initiative, see Hall S. Lusk, Forty-Five Years 
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